David Lloyd George, 1st Earl Lloyd-George of Dwyfor,[a] OM, PC (17 January 1863 – 26 March 1945) was a British statesman and Liberal Party politician. He was the final Liberal to serve as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

 

As Chancellor of the Exchequer (1908–1915) during H. H. Asquith's tenure as Prime Minister, Lloyd George was a key figure in the introduction of many reforms which laid the foundations of the modern welfare state. His most important role came as the highly energetic Prime Minister of the Wartime Coalition Government (1916–22), during and immediately after the First World War. He was a major player at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 that reordered Europe after the defeat of the Central Powers. Although he remained Prime Minister after the 1918 general election, the Conservatives were the largest party in the coalition, with the Liberals split between those loyal to Lloyd George, and those still supporting Asquith. He became the leader of the Liberal Party in the late 1920s, but it grew even smaller and more divided. By the 1930s he was a marginalised and widely mistrusted figure. He gave weak support to the war effort during the Second World War amidst fears that he was favourable toward Germany.

He was voted the third greatest British prime minister of the 20th century in a poll of 139 academics organised by MORI, and in 2002 he was named among the 100 Greatest Britons following a UK-wide vote.[2][3]

Upbringing and early life

Lloyd George was born on 17 January 1863 in Chorlton-on-Medlock, Manchester, to Welsh parents, and was brought up as a Welsh-speaker. He is so far the only British Prime Minister to have been Welsh[4] and to have spoken English as a second language.[5]

His father, William George, had been a teacher in both London and Liverpool. He also taught in the Hope Street Sunday Schools, which were administered by the Unitarians, where he met Unitarian minister Dr James Martineau.[6] In March of the same year, on account of his failing health, William George returned with his family to his native Pembrokeshire. He took up farming but died in June 1864 of pneumonia, aged 44. His widow, Elizabeth George (1828–96), sold the farm and moved with her children to her native Llanystumdwy in Caernarfonshire, where she lived in a cottage known as Highgate with her brother Richard Lloyd (1834–1917), who was a shoemaker, a minister (in the Scottish Baptists and then the Church of Christ),[7] and a strong Liberal. Lloyd George was educated at the local Anglican school Llanystumdwy National School and later under tutors. Lloyd George's uncle was a towering influence on him, encouraging him to take up a career in law and enter politics; his uncle remained influential up until his death at age 83 in February 1917, by which time his nephew had become Prime Minister. He added his uncle's surname to become "Lloyd George". His surname is usually given as "Lloyd George" and sometimes as "George". The influence of his childhood showed through in his entire career, as he attempted to aid the common man at the expense of what he liked to call "the Dukes" (that is, the aristocracy). However, his biographer John Grigg argued that Lloyd George's childhood was nowhere near as poverty-stricken as he liked to suggest, and that a great deal of his self-confidence came from having been brought up by an uncle who enjoyed a position of influence and prestige in his small community.

Brought up a devout evangelical, as a young man he suddenly lost his religious faith. Biographer Don Cregier says he became "a Deist and perhaps an agnostic, though he remained a chapel-goer and connoisseur of good preaching all his life."[8][9] He kept quiet about that, however, and was, according to Frank Owen, for 25 years "one of the foremost fighting leaders of a fanatical Welsh Nonconformity".[10]

It was also during this period of his life that Lloyd George first became interested in the issue of land ownership. As a young man he read books by Thomas Spence, John Stuart Mill and Henry George, as well as pamphlets written by George Bernard Shaw and Sidney Webb of the Fabian Society on the issue of land ownership.[11][12] By the age of twenty-one, he had already read and taken notes on Henry George's Progress and Poverty.[13] This strongly influenced Lloyd George's politics later in life; the People's Budget drew heavily on Georgist tax reform ideas.

Lloyd George in about 1890

Articled to a firm of solicitors in Porthmadog, Lloyd George was admitted in 1884 after taking Honours in his final law examination and set up his own practice in the back parlour of his uncle's house in 1885. The practice flourished, and he established branch offices in surrounding towns, taking his brother William into partnership in 1887. Although many Prime Ministers have been barristers, Lloyd George is to date the only solicitor to have held that office.[14]

By then he was politically active, having campaigned for the Liberal Party in the 1885 election, attracted by Joseph Chamberlain's "unauthorised programme" of reforms. The election resulted firstly in a stalemate with neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives having a majority, the balance of power being held by the Irish Parliamentary Party. William Gladstone's proposal to bring about Irish Home Rule split the party, with Chamberlain eventually leading the breakaway Liberal Unionists. Uncertain of which wing to follow, Lloyd George carried a pro-Chamberlain resolution at the local Liberal Club and travelled to Birmingham to attend the first meeting of Chamberlain's National Radical Union, but he had his dates wrong and arrived a week too early. In 1907, he was to say that he thought Chamberlain's plan for a federal solution correct in 1886 and still thought so, that he preferred the unauthorised programme to the Whig-like platform of the official Liberal Party, and that, had Chamberlain proposed solutions to Welsh grievances such as land reform and disestablishment, he, together with most Welsh Liberals, would have followed Chamberlain.[15]

He married Margaret Owen, the daughter of a well-to-do local farming family, on 24 January 1888.[16] Also in that year, he and other young Welsh Liberals founded a monthly paper Udgorn Rhyddid (Bugle of Freedom) and won on appeal to the Divisional Court of Queen's Bench the Llanfrothen burial case; this established the right of Nonconformists to be buried according to their own denominational rites in parish burial grounds, a right given by the Burial Laws Amendment Act 1880 that had up to then been ignored by the Anglican clergy. It was this case, which was hailed as a great victory throughout Wales, and his writings in Udgorn Rhyddid that led to his adoption as the Liberal candidate for Carnarvon Boroughs on 27 December 1888.[15]

In 1889, he became an Alderman on the Carnarvonshire County Council which had been created by the Local Government Act 1888. At that time he appeared to be trying to create a separate Welsh national party modelled on Parnell's Irish Parliamentary Party and worked towards a union of the North and South Wales Liberal Federations. For the same county Lloyd George would also become a JP (1910)[17] and chairman of Quarter Sessions (1929–38),[18] and DL in 1921.[17]

Member of Parliament

Lloyd George was returned as Liberal MP for Carnarvon Boroughs – by a margin of 18 votes – in a by-election on 10 April 1890, following the death of the Conservative member Edmund Swetenham.[19] He sat with an informal grouping of Welsh Liberal members who had a programme of disestablishing and disendowing the Church of England in Wales, temperance reform, and Welsh home rule. He would remain an MP for the same constituency until 1945, 55 years later.[20]

As backbench members of the House of Commons were not paid at that time, he supported himself and his growing family by continuing to practise as a solicitor, opening an office in London under the name of 'Lloyd George and Co.' and continuing in partnership with William George in Criccieth. In 1897, he merged his growing London practice with that of Arthur Rhys Roberts (who was to become Official Solicitor) under the name of 'Lloyd George, Roberts and Co.'.

Issues

He was soon speaking on Liberal issues (particularly temperance – the "local option" – and national as opposed to denominational education) throughout England as well as Wales. During the next decade, Lloyd George campaigned in Parliament largely on Welsh issues and in particular for disestablishment and disendowment of the Church of England. He wrote extensively for Liberal papers such as the Manchester Guardian. When Gladstone retired in 1894 after the defeat of the second Home Rule Bill, the Welsh Liberal members chose him to serve on a deputation to William Harcourt to press for specific assurances on Welsh issues; when those were not provided, they resolved to take independent action if the government did not bring a bill for disestablishment. When that was not forthcoming, he and three other Welsh Liberals (D. A. Thomas, Herbert Lewis and Frank Edwards) refused the whip on 14 April 1894, but accepted Lord Rosebery's assurance and rejoined the official Liberals on 29 May. Thereafter, he devoted much time to setting up branches of Cymru Fydd (Young Wales), which, he said, would in time become a force like the Irish National Party. He abandoned this idea after being criticised in Welsh newspapers for bringing about the defeat of the Liberal Party in the 1895 election and, at a meeting in Newport on 16 January 1896 of the South Wales Liberal Federation, led by D. A. Thomas, he was shouted down.[21]

Lloyd George also supported the idea of Pan-Celtic unity and gave a speech at the 1904 Pan-Celtic Congress in Caernarfon.[22]

Opposes Boer War

Lloyd George had been impressed by his journey to Canada in 1899. Although sometimes wrongly supposed – both at the time and subsequently – to be a Little Englander, he was not an opponent of the British Empire per se, but in a speech at Birkenhead (21 November 1901) he stressed that it needed to be based on freedom, including for India, not "racial arrogance".[23] Consequently, he gained national fame by displaying vehement opposition to the Second Boer War.[24]

Following Rosebery's lead, he based his attack firstly on what were supposed to be Britain's war aims – remedying the grievances of the Uitlanders and in particular the claim that they were wrongly denied the right to vote, saying "I do not believe the war has any connection with the franchise. It is a question of 45% dividends" and that England (which did not then have universal male suffrage) was more in need of franchise reform than the Boer republics. A second attack came on the cost of the war, which, he argued, prevented overdue social reform in England, such as old age pensions and workmen's cottages. As the fighting continued, his attacks moved to its conduct by the generals, who, he said (basing his words on reports by William Burdett-Coutts in The Times), were not providing for the sick or wounded soldiers and were starving Boer women and children in concentration camps. But his major thrusts were reserved for the Chamberlains, accusing them of war profiteering through the family company Kynoch Ltd, of which Chamberlain's brother was Chairman. The firm had won tenders to the War Office though its prices were higher than some of its competitors. After speaking at a meeting in Birmingham, Lloyd George had to be smuggled out disguised as a policeman, as his life was in danger from the mob. At this time the Liberal Party was badly split as H. H. Asquith, R. B. Haldane and others were supporters of the war and formed the Liberal Imperial League.[25]

David Lloyd George in 1902

Opposes Education Act of 1902

Lloyd George was the spokesman for the Nonconformists, and they made a major issue out of the government's Education Act 1902. It provided local funding for Church of England schools, which represented the religious enemy. The bill passed but opposition to it helped reunite the Liberals. His successful amendment that the county need only fund those schools where the buildings were in good repair served to make the Act a dead letter in Wales, where the counties were able to show that most Church of England schools were in poor repair. Having already gained national recognition for his anti-Boer War campaigns, his leadership of the attacks on the Education Act gave him a strong parliamentary reputation and marked him as a likely future cabinet member.[26]

Marconi scandal 1913

In 1913, Lloyd George, along with Rufus Isaacs, the Attorney General, was involved in the Marconi scandal. Accused of speculating in Marconi shares on the inside information that they were about to be awarded a key government contract (which would have caused them to increase in value), he told the House of Commons that he had not speculated in the shares of "that company", which was not the whole truth as he had in fact speculated in shares of Marconi's American sister company. This scandal, which would have destroyed his career if the whole truth had come out at the time, was a precursor to the whiff of corruption (e.g. the sale of honours in 1922) that later surrounded Lloyd George's premiership.[41]

Welsh Church Act 1914

The Church of England no longer had majority adherence in most parts of Wales in preference to Wales-led Protestantism, in particular Methodism. Lloyd George had long called for disestablishment and was instrumental in introducing the Welsh Church Act 1914 which disestablished the Anglican Church in Wales (though, upon the outbreak of war, the actual coming into force of the Act was postponed by the Suspensory Act 1914 until 1920), removing the opportunity of the six Welsh Bishops in the new Church in Wales to apply ex officio to sit in the House of Lords and removing (disendowing) certain pre-1662 property rights.[42][43]

First World War

Lloyd George, seen as an opponent of war until the Agadir Crisis of 1911, was as surprised as almost everyone else by the outbreak of the First World War. On 23 July 1914, almost a month after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and on the eve of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, he made a speech advocating "economy" in the House of Commons, saying that Britain's relations with Germany were better than for many years.[44] On 27 July he told C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian that Britain would keep out of the impending war.[45] With the Cabinet divided, and most ministers reluctant for Britain to get involved, he struck Asquith as "statesmanlike" at the Cabinet meeting on 1 August, favouring keeping Britain's options open. The next day he seemed likely to resign if Britain intervened, but he held back at Cabinet on Monday 3 August, moved by news that Belgium would resist Germany's demand for passage for her army across her soil. He was seen as a key figure whose stance helped to persuade almost the entire Cabinet to support British intervention.[46][47] He was able to give the more pacifist members of the cabinet and the Liberal Party a principle - the rights of small nations - which meant they could support the war and maintain united political and popular support.[48]

Lloyd George remained in office as Chancellor of the Exchequer for the first year of the Great War. The budget of 17 November 1914 had to allow for lower taxation receipts because of the reduction in world trade. The Crimean and Boer Wars had largely been paid for out of taxation; but Lloyd George raised debt financing of £321 million. Large (but deferred) increases in Supertax and income tax rates were accompanied by increases in excise duties, and the budget produced a tax increase of £63 million in a full year.[49] His last budget, on 4 May 1915, showed a growing concern for the effects of alcohol on the war effort, with large increases in duties, and a scheme of state control of alcohol sales in specified areas. The excise proposals were opposed by the Irish Nationalists and the Conservatives, and were abandoned.[50]

Minister of Munitions

David Lloyd George in 1915

Lloyd George gained a heroic reputation with his energetic work as Minister of Munitions, 1915–16, setting the stage for his move up to the height of power. After a long struggle with the War Office, he wrested responsibility for arms production away from the generals, making it a purely industrial department, with considerable expert assistance from Walter Runciman.[51] The two men gained the respect of Liberal cabinet colleagues for improving administrative capabilities, and increasing outputs.[52]

When the Shell Crisis of 1915 dismayed public opinion with the news that the Army was running short of artillery shells, demands rose for a strong leader to take charge of munitions. In the first coalition ministry, formed in May 1915, Lloyd George was made Minister of Munitions, heading a new department.[53] In this position he won great acclaim, which formed the basis for his political ascent. All historians agree that he boosted national morale and focused attention on the urgent need for greater output, but many also say the increase in munitions output in 1915–16 was due largely to reforms already underway, though not yet effective, before he had even arrived. The Ministry broke through the cumbersome bureaucracy of the War Office, resolved labour problems, rationalised the supply system and dramatically increased production. Within a year it became the largest buyer, seller, and employer in Britain.[51]

Lloyd George was not at all satisfied with the progress of the war. He wanted to "knock away the props", by attacking Germany's allies – from early in 1915 he argued for the sending of British troops to the Balkans to assist Serbia and bring Greece and other Balkan countries onto the side of the Allies (this was eventually done – the Salonika expedition – although not on the scale that Lloyd George had wanted, and mountain ranges made his suggestions of grand Balkan offensives impractical); in 1916 he wanted to send machine guns to Romania (insufficient amounts were available for this to be feasible). These suggestions began a period of poor relations with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Robertson, who was "brusque to the point of rudeness" and "barely concealed his contempt for Lloyd George's military opinions", to which he was in the habit of retorting "I've 'eard different".[54]

Lloyd George persuaded Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, to raise a Welsh Division, and, despite Kitchener's threat of resignation, to recognise nonconformist chaplains in the Army.[55]

Late in 1915 Lloyd George became a strong supporter of general conscription, an issue that divided principled Liberals, but helped the passage of several conscription acts from January 1916 onwards. In spring 1916, Alfred Milner hoped Lloyd George could be persuaded to bring down the coalition government by resigning, but this did not happen.[56]

Secretary of State for War

Lloyd George in 1916

In June 1916, Lloyd George succeeded Lord Kitchener (who died when his ship was sunk) as Secretary of State for War, although he had little control over strategy, as General Robertson had been given direct right of access to the Cabinet so as to bypass Kitchener. However, he did succeed in securing the appointment of Sir Eric Geddes to take charge of military railways behind British lines in France, with the honorary rank of major-general.[57] Lloyd George told a journalist, Roy W. Howard, in late September that "the fight must be to a finish – to a knockout", a rejection of President Wilson's offer to mediate.[58]

Lloyd George was increasingly frustrated at the limited gains of the Somme Offensive, criticising General Haig to Ferdinand Foch on a visit to the Western Front in September (British casualty ratios were worse than those of the French, who were more experienced and had more artillery), proposing sending Robertson on a mission to Russia (he refused to go), and demanding that more troops be sent to Salonika to help Romania. Robertson eventually threatened to resign.[59]

Much of the press still argued that the professional leadership of Haig and Robertson was preferable to civilian interference which had led to disasters like Gallipoli and Kut. Lord Northcliffe, owner of The Times stormed into Lloyd George's office and, finding him unavailable, told his secretary "You can tell him that I hear he has been interfering with Strategy, and that if he goes on I will break him", and the same day (11 October) Lloyd George also received a warning letter from H. A. Gwynne, editor of the Morning Post. He was obliged to give his "word of honour" to Asquith that he had complete confidence in Haig and Robertson and thought them irreplaceable, but he wrote to Robertson wanting to know how their differences had been leaked to the press (affecting to believe that Robertson had not personally "authorised such a breach of confidence & discipline"). He asserted his right to express his opinions about strategy in November, by which time ministers had taken to holding meetings to which Robertson was not invited.[60]

The weakness of Asquith as a planner and organiser was increasingly apparent to senior officials. After Asquith had refused to agree to Lloyd George's demand that he should be allowed to chair a small committee to manage the war, he resigned in December 1916. Grey was among leading Asquithians who had identified Lloyd George's intentions the previous month.[61] Lloyd George himself became Prime Minister, with the nation demanding he take vigorous charge of the war. A Punch cartoon of the time showed him as "The New Conductor" conducting the orchestra in the "Opening of the 1917 Overture".[62]

Although during the political crisis Robertson had advised Lloyd George to "stick to it" and form a small War Council, Lloyd George had planned if necessary to appeal to the country, his Military Secretary Colonel Arthur Lee having prepared a memo blaming Robertson and the General Staff for the loss of Serbia and Romania. Lloyd George was restricted by his promise to the Unionists to keep Haig as Commander-in-Chief and the press support for the generals, although Milner and Curzon were also sympathetic to campaigns to increase British power in the Middle East.[63] After Germany's offer (12 December 1916) of a negotiated peace, Lloyd George rebuffed President Wilson's request for the belligerents to state their war aims by demanding terms tantamount to German defeat.[64]

Prime Minister (1916–1922)

The fall of Asquith as Prime Minister split the Liberal Party into two factions: those who supported him and those who supported the coalition government. In his War Memoirs, Lloyd George compared himself with Asquith:[65]

There are certain indispensable qualities essential to the Chief Minister of the Crown in a great war. . . . Such a minister must have courage, composure, and judgment. All this Mr. Asquith possessed in a superlative degree. . . . But a war minister must also have vision, imagination and initiative—he must show untiring assiduity, must exercise constant oversight and supervision of every sphere of war activity, must possess driving force to energize this activity, must be in continuous consultation with experts, official and unofficial, as to the best means of utilising the resources of the country in conjunction with the Allies for the achievement of victory. If to this can be added a flair for conducting a great fight, then you have an ideal War Minister.

After December 1916, Lloyd George relied on the support of Conservatives and of the press baron Lord Northcliffe (who owned both The Times and the Daily Mail). Besides the Prime Minister, the five-member War Cabinet contained three Conservatives (Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Lords Lord Curzon, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the House of Commons Bonar Law, and Minister without Portfolio Lord Milner) and Arthur Henderson, unofficially representing Labour. Edward Carson was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, as had been widely touted during the intrigues of the previous month, but excluded from the War Cabinet. Amongst the few Liberal frontbenchers to support Lloyd George were Christopher Addison (who had played an important role in drumming up some backbench Liberal support for Lloyd George), H. A. L. Fisher, Lord Rhondda and Sir Albert Stanley. Edwin Montagu and Churchill joined the government in the summer of 1917.[66]

Lloyd George, Edward Grey, Herbert Kitchener, Nikola Pašić, Antonio Salandra, Alexander Izvolsky, Aristide Briand, Joseph Joffre at a conference of the Allied Powers on 27–28 March 1916 in Paris

Lloyd George wanted to make the destruction of Ottoman Empire a major British war aim, and two days after taking office told Robertson that he wanted a major victory, preferably the capture of Jerusalem, to impress British public opinion.[67]

At the Rome Conference (5–6 January 1917) Lloyd George was discreetly quiet about plans to take Jerusalem, an object which advanced British interests rather than doing much to win the war. Lloyd George proposed sending heavy guns to Italy with a view to defeating Austria-Hungary, possibly to be balanced by a transfer of Italian troops to Salonika, but was unable to obtain the support of the French or Italians, and Robertson talked of resigning.[68]

Nivelle Affair

Lloyd George engaged almost constantly in intrigues calculated to reduce the power of the generals, including trying to subordinate British forces in France to the French General Nivelle. He backed Nivelle because he thought he had 'proved himself to be a Man' by his successful counterattacks at Verdun, and because of his promises that he could break the German lines in 48 hours. Nivelle increasingly complained of Haig's dragging his feet rather than co-operating with their plans for the offensive.[69]

The plan was to put British forces under Nivelle's direct command for the great 1917 offensive. The British would attack first, thereby tying down the German reserves. Then the French would strike and score an overwhelming victory in two days. It was announced at a War Cabinet meeting on 24 February, to which neither Robertson nor Lord Derby (Secretary of State for War) had been invited. Ministers felt that the French generals and staff had shown themselves more skillful than the British in 1916, whilst politically Britain had to give wholehearted support to what would probably be the last major French effort of the war. The Nivelle proposal was then given to Robertson and Haig without warning on 26–27 February (minutes from the War Cabinet meeting were not sent to the King until 28 February, so that he did not have a prior chance to object). Robertson in particular protested vehemently. Finally a compromise was reached whereby Haig would be under Nivelle's orders but would retain operational control of British forces and keep a right of appeal to London "if he saw good reason". After further argument the status quo, that Haig was an ally of the French but was expected to defer to their wishes, was largely restored in mid-March.[70][71][72][73]

In the event the British attack at the Battle of Arras (9–14 April 1917) was partly successful but with much higher casualties than the Germans suffered. There had been many delays and the Germans, suspecting an attack, had shortened their lines to the strong Hindenburg Line. The French attack on the Aisne River in mid-April gained some tactically important high ground but failed to achieve the promised decisive breakthrough, pushing the French Army to the point of mutiny. While Haig gained prestige, Lloyd George lost credibility, and the affair further poisoned relations between himself and the "Brasshats".[74]

Russian Revolution

Lloyd George welcomed the Fall of the Tsar, both in a private letter to his brother and in a message to the new Russian Prime Minister, Prince Lvov, not least as the war could now be portrayed as a clash between liberal governments and the autocratic Central Powers. Like many observers he had been taken by surprise by the exact timing of the revolution (it had not been predicted by Lord Milner or General Wilson on their visit to Russia a few weeks earlier) and hoped – albeit with some concerns – that Russia's war effort would be invigorated like that of France in the early 1790s.[82]

Lloyd George gave a cautious welcome to the suggestion (19 March on the western calendar) of the Russian Foreign Minister Pavel Milyukov that the toppled Tsar and his family be given sanctuary in Britain (although Lloyd George would have preferred that they go to a neutral country). From the very start the King's adviser Stamfordham raised objections, and in April the British government withdrew its consent under Royal pressure. Eventually the Russian Royal Family were moved to the Urals where they were executed in 1918. Lloyd George was often blamed for the refusal of asylum, and in his memoirs he did not mention King George V's role in the matter, which was not explicitly confirmed until Kenneth Rose's biography of the King was published in 1983.[83]

Imperial War Cabinet

David Lloyd George circa 1918

An Imperial War Cabinet, including representatives from Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and India, met in March–May 1917 (a crisis period of the war) and twice in 1918. The idea was not entirely without precedent as there had been Imperial Conferences in 1902, 1907 and 1911, whilst the Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes had been invited to attend the Cabinet and War Committee on his visit to the UK in the spring of 1916. The South African Jan Smuts was appointed to the British War Cabinet in the early summer of 1917.[84]

Passchendaele

Lloyd George set up a War Policy Committee (himself, Curzon, Milner, Law and Smuts, with Maurice Hankey as secretary) to discuss strategy, which held 16 meetings over the next six weeks. At the very first meeting (11 June) Lloyd George proposed helping the Italians to capture Trieste,[85] explicitly telling the War Policy Committee (21 June 1917) that he wanted Italian soldiers to be killed rather than British.[86]

Haig believed that a Flanders Offensive had good chance of clearing the Belgian coast, from which German submarines and destroyers were operating (a popular goal with politicians), and that victory at Ypres "might quite possibly lead to (German) collapse". Robertson was less optimistic, but preferred Britain to keep her focus on defeating Germany on the Western Front, and had told Haig that the politicians would not "dare" overrule both soldiers if they gave the same advice. Haig promised he had no "intention of entering into a tremendous offensive involving heavy losses" (20 June) whilst Robertson wanted to avoid "disproportionate loss" (23 June).[87]

The Flanders Offensive was reluctantly sanctioned by the War Policy Committee on 18 July and the War Cabinet two days later, on condition it did not degenerate into a long drawn-out fight like the Somme. The War Cabinet promised to monitor progress and casualties and, if necessary call a halt, although in the event they made little effort to monitor progress until September. Frustrated at his inability to get his way, Lloyd George talked of resigning and taking his case to the public.[88]

The Battle of Passchendaele began on 31 July, but soon became bogged down in unseasonably early wet weather, which turned much of the battlefield into barely passable swamp in which men and animals sometimes drowned, whilst the mud and rain severely reduced the accuracy and effectiveness of artillery, the dominant weapon of the time. Lloyd George tried to enlist the King for diverting efforts against Austria-Hungary, telling Stamfordham (14 August) that the King and Prime Minister were "joint trustees of the nation" who had to avoid waste of manpower. A new Italian offensive began (18 August), but Robertson advised that it was "false strategy" to call off Passchendaele to send reinforcements to Italy, and despite being summoned to George Riddell's home in Sussex, where he was served apple pudding (his favourite dish), agreed only reluctantly. The Anglo-French leadership agreed in early September to send 100 heavy guns to Italy (50 of them French) rather than the 300 which Lloyd George wanted – Lloyd George talked of ordering a halt to Passchendaele, but in Hankey's words "funked it" (4 September). Had he not done so his government might have fallen, for as soon as the guns reached Italy Cadorna called off his offensive (21 September).[89]

At a meeting at Boulogne (25 September) Lloyd George broached with Painlevé the setting up of an Allied Supreme War Council then making Foch generalissimo.[90] Bonar Law had written to Lloyd George that ministers must soon decide whether or not the offensive was to continue. Lloyd George and Robertson met Haig in France (26 September) to discuss the recent German peace feelers (which in the end were publicly repudiated by Chancellor Michaelis)[91] and the progress of the offensive. Haig preferred to continue, encouraged by Plumer's recent successful attacks in dry weather at Menin Road (20 September) and Polygon Wood (26 September), and stating that the Germans were "very worn out". In October the wet weather returned for the final attack towards Passchendaele.[92] At the final meeting of the War Policy Committee on 11 October 1917, Lloyd George authorised the offensive to continue, but warning of failure in three weeks' time. Hankey (21 October) claimed in his diary that Lloyd George had deliberately allowed Passchendaele to continue in order to discredit Haig and Robertson and make it easier for him to forbid similar offensives in 1918.[93]

Supreme War Council

Lloyd George played a critical role in the Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour's famous Declaration: "His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

The Italians suffered disastrous defeat at Caporetto, requiring British and French reinforcements to be sent. Lloyd George said he "wanted to take advantage of Caporetto to gain "control of the War".[94] The Supreme War Council was inaugurated at the Rapallo Conference (6–7 November 1917). Lloyd George then gave a controversial speech at Paris (12 November) at which he criticised the high casualties of recent Allied "victories" (a word which he used with an element of sarcasm). These events led to an angry Commons debate (19 November), which Lloyd George survived.[95]

In reply to Robertson's 19 November memo, which warned (correctly) that the Germans would use the opportunity of Russia's departure from the war to attack in 1918 before the Americans were present in strength, Lloyd George wrote (wrongly) that the Germans would not attack and would fail if they did. That autumn he declared that he was willing "to risk his whole political reputation" to avoid a repetition of the Somme or Passchendaele.[96]

In December 1917, Lloyd George remarked to C. P. Scott that: "If people really knew, the war would be stopped tomorrow. But of course they don't know, and can't know."[97]

Manpower crisis and the unions

A Manpower Committee was set up on 6 December 1917, consisting of the Prime Minister, Curzon, Carson, George Barnes and Smuts with Maurice Hankey as secretary, and Auckland Geddes (Minister of National Service – in charge of Army recruitment) in regular attendance.[98]

The first meeting of the Manpower Committee was on 10 December, and it met twice the next day and again on 15 December. Lloyd George questioned Generals Macready (Adjutant-General) and Macdonogh (Chief of Military Intelligence), who advised that the Allied superiority of numbers on the Western Front would not survive the transfer of German reinforcements from the East now that Russia was dropping out of the war. Deeply concerned about the publicity attracted by the recent Lansdowne Letter's mention of casualties, he suggested removing Haig and Robertson from office at this time, but this was met by a threat of resignation from Lord Derby. At this stage Lloyd George opposed extending conscription to Ireland – Carson advised that extending conscription to Ulster alone would be impractical.[99]

When Hankey's report eventually emerged it reflected Lloyd George's wishes: it gave top priority to shipbuilding and merchant shipping (not least to ship US troops to Europe), and placed Army manpower below both weapons production and civilian industry. The size of the Army in Britain was to be reduced from eight divisions to four, freeing about 40,000 men for service in France.[100] In the House of Commons (20 December) Lloyd George also argued that the collapse of Russia and defeat of Italy required further "combing-out" of men from industry, in breach of pledges given to the trade unions in 1916. Auckland Geddes was given increased powers to direct labour – a new bill became law, despite the opposition of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, in February 1918.[100]

The unions were placated with the Caxton Hall conference (5 January 1918), at which Lloyd George outlined Allied war aims. He called for Germany to be stripped of her conquests (including her colonies, and Alsace-Lorraine, annexed in 1871) and democratised (although he was clear that this was not an Allied war aim, but something which would help to ensure the future peace of Europe), and for the liberation of the subject peoples of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. He also hinted at reparations (although it was suggested that these would not be on the scale imposed on France after 1871) and a new international order. Lloyd George explained to critics that he was hoping to detach Austria-Hungary and turn the German people against her rulers; the speech greatly increased his support amongst trade unions and the Labour Party.[101] President Wilson at first considered abandoning his speech outlining US war aims – the "Fourteen Points", many of which were similar to the aims outlined by Lloyd George – but was persuaded by his adviser Colonel House to deliver it. Wilson's speech (8 January) overshadowed Lloyd George's, and is better remembered by posterity.[102]

Strategic priorities

Lloyd George had told Edmund Allenby, who was appointed the new commander in Egypt in June, that his objective was "Jerusalem before Christmas" and that he had only to ask for reinforcements, although the exact nature of his offensives was still undecided when he was appointed. Amidst months of argument throughout the autumn of 1917 Robertson was able to block Lloyd George's plan to make Palestine the main theatre of operations by having Allenby make the impossible demand that thirteen extra divisions be sent to him.[103][104] Allenby captured Jerusalem in December 1917.

In the winter of 1917/18 Lloyd George secured the resignations of both the service chiefs. Removing the First Sea Lord Admiral Jellicoe earlier in 1917, as Lloyd George wanted, would have been politically impossible given Conservative anger at the return of Churchill (still blamed for the Dardanelles) to office as Minister of Munitions in July, and Lloyd George's preoccupations with Passchendaele, Caporetto and the Supreme War Council from July onward. By December it was clear that Lloyd George would have to sack Jellicoe or lose Eric Geddes (First Lord of the Admiralty), who wanted to return to his previous job in charge of military transport in France. The Christmas holiday, when Parliament was not sitting, provided a good opportunity. Before Jellicoe left for leave on Christmas Eve he received a letter from Geddes demanding his resignation. The other Sea Lords talked of resigning but did not do so, whilst Jellicoe's ally Carson remained a member of the War Cabinet until he resigned in January over Irish Home Rule.[105]

Relations with General Robertson had worsened further over the creation of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and he was eventually forced out over his insistence that the British delegate there be subordinate to Robertson as CIGS in London.[106]

Crises of 1918

In rapid succession in spring 1918 came a series of military and political crises.[110] The Germans, having moved troops from the Eastern front and retrained them in new tactics, now had more soldiers on the Western Front than the Allies. Germany launched the full scale Spring Offensive starting on 21 March against the British and French lines, hoping for victory on the battlefield before the American troops arrived in numbers. The Allied armies fell back 40 miles in confusion, and, facing defeat, London realised it needed more troops to fight a mobile war. Lloyd George found half a million soldiers and rushed them to France, asked American President Woodrow Wilson for immediate help, and agreed to the appointment of French General Foch as commander in chief on the Western Front. He considered taking on the role of War Minister himself, but was dissuaded by the king, and instead appointed Lord Milner.[111]

Despite strong warnings that it was a bad idea, the War Cabinet decided to impose conscription on Ireland. The main reason was that trade unions in Britain demanded it as the price for cutting back on conscription exemptions for certain workers. Labour wanted the principle established that no one was exempt, but it did not demand that conscription actually take place in Ireland. The proposal was enacted but never enforced. The Catholic bishops for the first time entered the fray and called for open resistance to conscription. Many Irish Catholics and nationalists moved into Sinn Féin, a decisive moment marking the dominance of Irish politics by a party committed to leaving the UK altogether.[112][113]

At one point Lloyd George unknowingly misled the House of Commons in claiming that Haig's forces were stronger at the start of 1918 than they had been a year earlier – in fact the increase was in the number of labourers, most of them Chinese, Indians and black South Africans, and Haig had fewer infantry, holding a longer stretch of front.[114] The prime minister had used incorrect information furnished by the War Department office headed by Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice. Maurice then made the spectacular public allegation that the War Cabinet had deliberately held soldiers back from the Western Front, and both Lloyd George and Bonar Law had lied to Parliament about it. Instead of going to the prime minister about the problem Maurice had waited and then broke King's Regulations by making a public attack. Asquith, the Liberal leader in the House, took up the allegations and attacked Lloyd George, which further ripped apart the Liberal Party. While Asquith's presentation was poorly done, Lloyd George vigorously defended his position, treating the debate as a vote of confidence. He won over the House with a powerful refutation of Maurice's allegations.[115][116]

Meanwhile, the German offensive stalled. By summer the Americans were sending 10,000 fresh men a day to the Western Front, a speedup made possible by leaving their equipment behind and using British and French munitions. The German army had used up its last reserves and was steadily shrinking in numbers, further weakening its resolve. Victory came on 11 November 1918.[117]

Postwar Prime Minister (1918–1922)

Snowed underSt. Bernard Pup (to his Master). "This situation appeals to my hereditary instincts. Shall I come to the rescue?"[Before leaving Switzerland Mr. Lloyd George purchased a St. Bernard pup.]Cartoon from Punch 15 September 1920

At the end of the war Lloyd George's reputation stood at its zenith. Bonar Law, who was from a similar modest provincial background, said "He can be dictator for life if he wishes."[118] Headlines at this time declared a "huge majority win" and that "pacifists, even 'shining lights' such as Arnold Lupton, had been completely overthrown by Ramsay MacDonald and Philip Snowden".[119]

Paris 1919

Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George and Vittorio Orlando at Paris

"The Big Four" made all the major decisions at the Paris Peace Conference (from left to right, Lloyd George, Vittorio Emanuele Orlando of Italy, Georges Clemenceau of France, Woodrow Wilson of the U.S.)

Lloyd George represented Britain at the Paris Peace Conference, clashing with the French Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau, the US President, Woodrow Wilson, and the Italian Prime Minister, Vittorio Orlando.[126] Unlike Clemenceau and Orlando, Lloyd George on the whole stood on the side of generosity and moderation. He did not want to utterly destroy the German economy and political system—as Clemenceau demanded—with massive reparations. The economist John Maynard Keynes looked askance at Lloyd George's economic credentials in The Economic Consequences of the Peace, calling the Prime Minister a "goat-footed bard, half-human visitor to our age from the hag-ridden magic and enchanted woods of Celtic antiquity".[127]

Lloyd George was also responsible for the pro-German shift in the peace conditions regarding borders of Poland. Instead of handing over Upper Silesia (2,073,000 people), and the southern part of East Prussia (720,000 people) to Poland as was planned before, the plebiscite was organised. Danzig (366,000 people) was organised as Free City of Danzig. Poles were grateful that he had saved that country from the Bolsheviks but were annoyed by his comment that Poles were "children who gave trouble".[128] Asked how he had done at the peace conference, he commented, "I think I did as well as might be expected, seated as I was between Jesus Christ [Wilson] and Napoleon Bonaparte [Clemenceau]."[129]

Historian Antony Lentin evaluates his role in Paris as a major success:

Unrivaled as a negotiator, he had powerful combative instincts and indomitable determinism, and succeeded through charm, insight, resourcefulness, and simple pugnacity. Although sympathetic to France's desires to keep Germany under control, he did much to prevent the French from gaining power, attempted to extract Britain from the Anglo-French entente, inserted the war-guilt clause, and maintained a liberal and realist view of the postwar world. By doing so, he managed to consolidate power over the House, secured his power base, expanded the empire, and sought a European balance of power.[130] Postwar social reforms

A major programme of social reform was introduced under Lloyd George in the last months of the war, and in the post-war years. The Workmen's Compensation (Silicosis) Act 1918 (which was introduced a year later) allowed for compensation to be paid to men "who could prove they had worked in rock which contained no less than 80% silica."[131] The Education Act 1918 raised the school leaving age to 14, increased the powers and duties of the Board of Education (together with the money it could provide to Local Education Authorities), and introduced a system of day-continuation schools which youths between the ages of 14 and 16 "could be compelled to attend for at least one day a week".[132] The Blind Persons Act 1920 provided assistance for unemployed blind people and blind persons who were in low paid employment.[133]

The Housing and Town Planning Act 1919 provided subsidies for house building by local authorities, and a total of 213,000 homes were built under this Act, which established, according to A. J. P. Taylor, "the principle that housing was a social service".[134] Under the act 30,000 houses were constructed by private enterprise with government subsidy.[135] The Land Settlement (Facilities) Act 1919 and Land Settlement (Scotland) Acts of 1919 encouraged local authorities to provide land for people to take up farming "and also to provide allotments in urban areas."

The Rent Act 1920 was intended to safeguard working-class tenants against exorbitant rent increases, but it failed.[136] Rent controls were continued after the war, and an "out-of-work donation" was introduced for ex-servicemen and civilians.[137]

Last years

In the last important parliamentary intervention of his career, which occurred during the crucial Norway Debate of May 1940, Lloyd George made a powerful speech that helped to undermine Chamberlain as Prime Minister and to pave the way for the ascendancy of Churchill. Churchill offered Lloyd George the agriculture portfolio in his Cabinet but he refused, citing his unwillingness to sit alongside Chamberlain. Lloyd George also thought that Britain's chances in the war were dim, and he remarked to his secretary: "I shall wait until Winston is bust."[186] He wrote to the Duke of Bedford in September 1940, during the Battle of Britain, advocating a negotiated peace with Germany.[187]

A pessimistic speech by Lloyd George on 7 May 1941 led Churchill to compare him with Philippe Pétain. On 11 June 1942, he made his last-ever speech in the House of Commons, and he cast his last vote in the Commons on 18 February 1943 as one of the 121 MPs (97 Labour) condemning the Government for its failure to back the Beveridge Report. Fittingly, his final vote was in defence of the welfare state which he had helped to create.[188]

Although he had displayed political courage all his life, in his last years he gave way to physical timidity and hypochondria. He continued to attend Castle Street Baptist Chapel in London, and to preside over the National Eisteddfod at its Thursday session each summer. In September 1944, he and Frances left Churt for Tŷ Newydd, a farm near his boyhood home in Llanystumdwy. He was now weakening rapidly and his voice failing. He was still an MP but had learned that wartime changes in the constituency meant that Carnarvon Boroughs might go Conservative at the next election. On New Years Day 1945, Lloyd George was raised to the peerage as Earl Lloyd-George of Dwyfor, and Viscount Gwynedd, of Dwyfor in the County of Caernarvonshire.[189]

Lloyd George's grave, Llanystumdwy

As it happened, he did not live long enough to take his seat in the House of Lords. He died of cancer on 26 March 1945, aged 82, his wife Frances and his daughter Megan at his bedside. Four days later, on Good Friday, he was buried beside the river Dwyfor in Llanystumdwy.[190]

A great boulder marks his grave; there is no inscription. However a monument designed by the architect Sir Clough Williams-Ellis was subsequently erected around the grave, bearing an englyn (strict-metre stanza) engraved on slate in his memory composed by his nephew Dr W. R. P. George.[191] Nearby stands the Lloyd George Museum, also designed by Williams-Ellis and opened in 1963.

Assessment

Historian Martin Pugh in The Oxford Companion to British History argues that he:

made a greater impact on British public life than any other 20th-cent. statesman. He laid the foundations of what later became the welfare state, and put a progressive income tax system at the centre of government finance. He also left his mark on the system of government by enlarging the scope of the prime minister's role. He was acclaimed, not without reason, as the 'Man Who Won the War'....he was blamed by many Liberals for destroying their party in 1918, hated in the Labour movement for his handling of industrial issues after 1918, and disparaged by Conservatives for his radicalism.[192]

George Riddell, 1st Baron Riddell, a wealthy newspaper publisher, was a close confidant and financial supporter of Lloyd George from 1908 to 1922, and Riddell's revealing diary is a valuable source for the period.[193] During Lloyd George's first year as prime minister, in summer 1917, Riddell assessed his personality:

His energy, capacity for work, and power of recuperation are remarkable. He has an extraordinary memory, imagination, and the art of getting at the root of a matter....He is not afraid of responsibility, and has no respect for tradition or convention. He is always ready to examine, scrap or revise established theories and practices. These qualities give him unlimited confidence in himself.... He is one of the craftiest of men, and his extraordinary charm of manner not only wins him friends, but does much to soften the asperities of his opponents and enemies. He is full of humour and a born actor....He has an instinctive power of divining the thoughts and intentions of people with whom he is conversing...His chief defects are: (1) Lack of appreciation of existing institutions, organisations, and stolid, dull people...their ways are not his ways and their methods are not his methods. (2) Fondness for a grandiose scheme in preference to an attempt to improve existing machinery. (3) Disregard of difficulties in carrying out big projects...he is not a man of detail.[194]

Historian John Shepherd wrote in History Today:

In any poll of modern historians Winston Churchill and David Lloyd George would emerge as the two most renowned prime ministers during the past century.[195]

Notes

1. Under the rules governing titles within the peerage, Lloyd George's name in his title was hyphenated even though his surname was not.

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171. Rowland 1976, pp. 630–33
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186. Cross 1975, p. 281
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Bibliography

Biographical

• Lord Beaverbrook (1963), The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George, Collins
• Cassar, George (2009), Lloyd George at War, 1916–1918, ISBN 1843317931
• Cregier, D. M. (1976), Bounder from Wales: Lloyd George's Career Before the First World War, Univ of Missouri Press
• Crosby, Travis. L. (2014), The Unknown David Lloyd George: A Statesman in Conflict, London: IB Tauris and Co. Ltd, ISBN 978-1-78076-485-6, retrieved 23 August 2014
• Gilbert, Bentley Brinkerhoff (1987), David Lloyd George: A Political Life: The Architect of Change 1863–1912
• Gilbert, Bentley Brinkerhoff (1992), David Lloyd George: A Political Life: Organizer of Victory, 1912–1916
• Grigg, John (2002) [first published 1973–2002], Lloyd George, 4 vols. Whitbread Award winner; the most detailed biography; ends Nov. 1918, all volumes reprinted in 2002
  • The Young Lloyd George (1973); Lloyd George: The People's Champion, 1902–1911 (1978); Lloyd George: From Peace to War, 1912–1916 (1985); Lloyd George: War Leader, 1916–1918 (2002)
• Hattersley, Roy (2010), David Lloyd George: The Great Outsider, Little Brown
• Jones, Thomas (1951), Lloyd George, Harvard University Press
• Morgan, Kenneth O. (2004), "George, David Lloyd, first Earl Lloyd-George of Dwyfor (1863–1945)", Oxford Dictionary of National Biography
• Owen, Frank (1955), Tempestuous Journey: Lloyd George, His Life and Times
• Price, Emyr (2006), David Lloyd George, Celtic Radicals, University of Wales Press
• Pugh, Martin (2009), Cannon, John, ed., Lloyd George, David, 1st Earl Lloyd-George in The Oxford Companion to British History (1st Revised ed.), Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acref/9780199567638.001.0001, ISBN 978-0-19-956763-8, retrieved 2016-02-09
• Purcell, Hugh (2006), Lloyd George, British prime ministers, Haus publications
• Rowland, Peter (1976), David Lloyd George: A Biography
• Taylor, A. J. P. (1961), Lloyd George: rise and fall
• Taylor, A. J. P., ed. (1971), Lloyd George: Twelve Essays

Specialized studies

• Adams, Ralph James Q. (1978), Arms and the Wizard: Lloyd George and the Ministry of Munitions, London
• Adams, Ralph James Q. (1997), "Andrew Bonar Law and the Fall of the Asquith Coalition: the December 1916 Cabinet Crisis", Canadian Journal of History, 32 (2): 185–200, doi:10.3138/cjh.32.2.185, ISSN 0008-4107
• Adams, Ralph James Q. (1975), "Delivering the Goods: Reappraising the Ministry of Munitions: 1915–1916", Albion, 7 (3), JSTOR 4048178
• Adams, W.S. (February 1953), "Lloyd George and the Labour Movement", Past and Present, 3 (1): 55–64, doi:10.1093/past/3.1.55, JSTOR 650036
• Addison, Paul (1994), The Road to 1945. British Politics and the Second World War, London: Pimlico
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• Bennett, G. H. (1999), "Lloyd George, Curzon and the Control of British Foreign Policy 1919–22", The Australian Journal of Politics and History, 45
• Burke's Peerage, Baronetage and Knightage, 1949, Burke's Peerage Ltd., 1949
• Byrne, Tony; Padfield, Colin F (1978), Social Services, Made Simple Books, ISBN 0-434-90076-1
• Campbell, John (1977), Lloyd George, The Goat in the Wilderness, 1922–31, ISBN 0-224-01296-7
• Cashman, Sean (1988), America in the Age of the Titans: The Progressive Era and World War I, New York University Press, ISBN 978-0-8147-1411-9
• Corrigan, Gordon (2003-07-10), Mud, Blood and Poppycock, Cassell, ISBN 978-0-304-35955-4
• Davies, John (1994), A History of Wales, Penguin Books, ISBN 978-0-14-014581-6
• Davies, Norman (1971), "Lloyd George and Poland 1919–1920", Journal of Contemporary History, 6 (3): 132–154, doi:10.1177/002200947100600309
• Ehrman, John (1961), "Lloyd George and Churchill as War Ministers", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 11 (5th Ser.): 101–115, doi:10.2307/3678753, JSTOR 3678753
• Fair, John D. (September 1977), "Politicians, Historians, and the War: A Reassessment of the Political Crisis of December 1916", The Journal of Modern History, 49 (3, On Demand Supplement.): D1329–D1343, doi:10.1086/241657, JSTOR 1876750
• Fraser, Peter (1982), "The British 'Shells Scandal' of 1915", Canadian Journal of History, 18 (1)
• French, David (1995), The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916–1918, Oxford U.P.
• Fry, Michael (September 1988), "Political Change in Britain, August 1914 to December 1916: Lloyd George Replaces Asquith: The Issues Underlying the Drama", The Historical Journal, 31 (3): 609–627, doi:10.1017/s0018246x00023517, JSTOR 2639759
• Gilbert, Bentley Brinkerhoff (March 1978), "David Lloyd George: The Reform of British Landholding and the Budget of 1914", The Historical Journal, 21 (1): 117–141, doi:10.1017/s0018246x00000388, JSTOR 2638451
• Gilbert, Bentley Brinkerhoff (December 1976), "David Lloyd George: Land, The Budget, and Social Reform", The American Historical Review, 81 (5): 1058–1066, doi:10.2307/1852870, JSTOR 1852870
• Gooch, John (1968), "The Maurice Debate 1918", Journal of Contemporary History, 3 (4), JSTOR 259859
• Grey, Viscount (1925), Twenty-Five Years 1892–1916, London
• Hamilton, Mary Agnes (1941), Women at Work: A Brief Introduction to Trade Unionism for Women, Routledge
• Hankey, Lord (1961), The Supreme Command, 1914–1918, 2 vols.
• Harnden, Toby (2011-10-27), Dead Men Risen: The Welsh Guards and the Real Story of Britain's War in Afghanistan, Quercus, ISBN 978-1-84916-423-8
• Hart, Peter (2008), 1918: A Very British Victory, London: Phoenix Books, ISBN 978-0-7538-2689-8
• Havighurst, Alfred F. (1966), Twentieth-Century Britain
• Havighurst, Alfred F. (1985), Britain in Transition: The Twentieth Century, University of Chicago Press, ISBN 978-0-226-31970-4, retrieved 2016-02-10
• Hazlehurst, Cameron (July 1970), "Asquith as Prime Minister, 1908–1916", The English Historical Review, 85 (336): 502–531, doi:10.1093/ehr/lxxxv.336.502, JSTOR 563193
• Jeffery, Keith (2006), Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-820358-2
• Jenkins, Roy (1964), Asquith (first ed.), London: Collins, OCLC 243906913
• Jenkins, Roy (1998), The Chancellors, Macmillan, ISBN 0333730577
• Jones, J Graham. (2007), "Lloyd George", Dictionary of Liberal Thought, London: Brack & Randall
• Kelly's Handbook of the Titled, Landed and Official Classes, 1945, Kelly's Directories Ltd., 1945, p. 1185
• Kernek, Sterling J. (1975), "Distractions of Peace during War: The Lloyd George Government's Reactions to Woodrow Wilson, December, 1916-November, 1918", Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 65 (2): 1–117, doi:10.2307/1006183, JSTOR 1006183
• Keynes, John Maynard (1920). "The Economic Consequences of the Peace".famous criticism of versailles Treaty as too harsh on Germany, by leading economist.
• Koss, Stephen (1985), Asquith, London: Hamish Hamilton, ISBN 978-0-231-06155-1
• Lentin, Antony (2004), Lloyd George and the Lost Peace: From Versailles to Hitler, 1919–1940
• Lentin, Antony (December 2004), "Maynard Keynes and the 'Bamboozlement' of Woodrow Wilson: What Really Happened at Paris?", Diplomacy & Statecraft, 15 (4): 725–763, doi:10.1080/09592290490886829 why veterans' pensions were included in reparations
• Lentin, Antony. "Several types of ambiguity: Lloyd George at the Paris peace conference." Diplomacy and Statecraft 6.1 (1995): 223-251.
• Longford, Ruth (1996), Frances, Countess Lloyd George: more than a mistress, Gracewing Publishing
• Lowe, Norman (1984), Mastering Modern World History, St. Martin's Press, ISBN 978-0-312-52102-8
• McIvor, Arthur; Johnston, Ronald (2007), Miners' Lung: A History of Dust Disease in British Coal Mining, Ashgate, ISBN 978-0-7546-3673-1
• McKinstry, Leo (2005-05-23), Rosebery: Statesman in Turmoil, John Murray, ISBN 978-0-7195-5879-5
• MacMillan, Margaret (2001), Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War, John Murray, ISBN 978-0-7195-5939-6
• McGarry, Fearghal (2010), The Rising: Easter 1916, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-150109-8
• Marriott, J.A.R. Modern England, 1885-1945 (1948) pp 390–516 on Lloyd-George as Prime Minister. online
• Millman, Brock (2001), "A Counsel of Despair: British Strategy and War Aims, 1917–18", Journal of Contemporary History, 36 (2): 241–270, doi:10.1177/002200940103600201, ISSN 0022-0094, JSTOR 261225
• Millman, Brock (Winter 2002), "The Lloyd George War Government, 1917–18", Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions, 3 (3): 99–127, doi:10.1080/714005491; sees proto-fascism
• Morgan, Kenneth O. (1974), Lloyd George
• Morgan, Kenneth O. (March 1970), "Lloyd George's Premiership: A Study in 'Prime Ministerial Government", The Historical Journal, 13, JSTOR 2637826
• Morgan, Kenneth O (1996), "Lloyd George and Germany", The Historical Journal, 39 (3): 755–766, doi:10.1017/s0018246x00024547, JSTOR 2639970
• Mowat, C. L. (1955), Britain Between The Wars 1918–1940, Methuen
• Murray, Bruce K. (September 1973), "The Politics of the 'People's Budget'", The Historical Journal, 16 (3): 555–570, doi:10.1017/s0018246x00002946, JSTOR 2638204
• Murray, B. K. (1980), The People's Budget, 1909–1910: Lloyd George and Liberal politics, Oxford University Press
• Owen, David (2014), The Hidden Perspective: The Military Conversations 1906–1914, London
• Pearce, Malcolm; Stewart, Geoffrey (2002), British political history, 1867–2001: democracy and decline, Routledge, ISBN 0-415-26869-9
• Powell, David (2004), British Politics, 1910–1935: The Crisis of the Party System
• Radhakrishnan, Sita (1992), Welfare Services in the Netherlands and United Kingdom, New Delhi: Northern Book Centre, ISBN 81-7211-026-X
• Ramsden, John (1998-10-05), An Appetite for Power: A New History of the Conservative Party, HarperCollins, ISBN 978-0-00-255686-6
• Reynolds, David (2006), From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s, Oxford University Press
• Rose, Inbal A. (1999), Conservatism and Foreign Policy During the Lloyd George Coalition 1918–1922, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., ISBN 0-7146-4486-2, retrieved 2016-02-10
• Rudman, Stella (2011), Lloyd George and the Appeasement of Germany, 1919–1945, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, ISBN 978-1-4438-2657-0
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• Woodward, David R. (2004), Lloyd George and the Generals, F. Cass
• Woodward, Sir Llewellyn (1967), Great Britain and the War of 1914–1918
• Wrigley, Chris (1976), David Lloyd George and the British Labour Movement: Peace and War
• Who's Who, A & C Black, 1945

Primary sources

• Cross, Colin (1975), Life with Lloyd George: The Diary of A.J. Sylvester, Macmillan
• Jones, J. Graham (2001), The Lloyd George papers at the National Library of Wales & Other Repositories, National Library of Wales Aberystwyth
• Lloyd George, David (1938), The Truth About the Peace Treaties, 2 vols.
• Lloyd George, David (1933), War Memoirs Of David Lloyd George: Volume 1
• Lloyd George, David (1918), The Great Crusade: Extracts from Speeches Delivered During the War
• Egerton, George W. (March 1988), "The Lloyd George War Memoirs: A Study in the Politics of Memory", The Journal of Modern History, 60 (1): 55–94, doi:10.1086/243335, JSTOR 1880406
• Morgan, Kenneth O. (1973), Lloyd George Family Letters, 1885–1936
• Lord Riddell. Lord Riddells Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference And After (1933) online free, near-verbatim versions of interviews with Lloyd George by a close friend.
• Taylor, A. J. P., ed. (1975), My Darling Pussy: The Letters of Lloyd George and Frances Stevenson
• Taylor, A. J. P., ed. (1971), Lloyd George: A Diary by Frances Stevenson

Further reading

• Brack, Duncan, Robert Ingham, and Tony Little, eds. British Liberal Leaders (Biteback Publishing, 2015).
• Cregier, Don M. (May 1970), "The Murder of the British Liberal Party", The History Teacher, Vol.3 (No.4): 27–36, JSTOR 3054322 blames Asquith, Lloyd George and the voters.
• Dangerfield, George. The Strange Death of Liberal England (1935) online free; highly popular essay but controversial among scholars.
• Fry, Michael G. (1977), Lloyd George and Foreign Policy., Vol. 1: The Education of a Statesman: 1890–1916
• Hill, C. P. (1975), British Economic and Social History 1700–1964, Edward Arnold
• Johnson, Matthew (June 2008), "The Liberal War Committee and the Liberal Advocacy of Conscription in Britain, 1914–1916", The Historical Journal, 51 (2): 399–420, doi:10.1017/s0018246x08006766, JSTOR 20175167
• Morgan, Kenneth O. Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government 1918-1922 (1996) 442pp
• Searle, G. R. (2004), A New England? Peace and war, 1886–1918, Oxford University Press, large-scale survey of political and social history
• Somervell, D.C. The Reign of King George V, (1936) pp 161–306. online free
• Suttie, Andrew (2006), Rewriting the First World War: Lloyd George, Politics & Strategy, 1914–1918
• Toye, Richard. Lloyd George and Churchill: Rivals for Greatness (Pan Macmillan, 2008).
• Wilson, Trevor (1989), The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War 1914–1918, ISBN 0745606458 covers both the homefront and the battlefields

External links

• Hansard 1803–2005: contributions in Parliament by David Lloyd George
• More about David Lloyd George on the Downing Street website.
• Lloyd George Society website
• BBC Wales History – Profile of David Lloyd George
• www.notableabodes.com
• David Lloyd George Exhibition, National Library of Wales
• Portraits of David Lloyd George, 1st Earl Lloyd-George at the National Portrait Gallery, London
• "Archival material relating to David Lloyd George". UK National Archives.
• Newspaper clippings about David Lloyd George in the 20th Century Press Archives of the German National Library of Economics (ZBW)
• Works by David Lloyd George at LibriVox (public domain audiobooks)

Political offices
Preceded byThe Marquess of Salisbury	President of the Board of Trade1905–1908	Succeeded byWinston Churchill
Preceded byH. H. Asquith	Chancellor of the Exchequer1908–1915	Succeeded byReginald McKenna
New title	Minister of Munitions1915–1916	Succeeded byHon. Edwin Samuel Montagu
Preceded byThe Earl Kitchener	Secretary of State for War1916	Succeeded byThe Earl of Derby
Preceded byH. H. Asquith	Prime Minister of the United Kingdom1916–1922	Succeeded byBonar Law
Parliament of the United Kingdom
Preceded byEdmund Swetenham	Member of Parliament for Caernarvon Boroughs1890–1945	Succeeded bySeaborne Davies
Party political offices
Preceded byH. H. Asquith	Liberal Leader in the Commons1924–1931	Succeeded bySir Herbert Samuel
	Leader of the British Liberal Party1926–1931
Preceded byHenry Gladstone	President of the Welsh Liberal Federation1925–1938	Unknown
Academic offices
Preceded byThe Earl Beatty	Rector of the University of Edinburgh1920–1923	Succeeded byStanley Baldwin
Honorary titles
Preceded byT. P. O'Connor	Father of the House1929–1945	Succeeded byThe Earl Winterton
Records
Preceded byThe Earl of Balfour	Oldest living Prime Minister of the United Kingdom1930–1945	Succeeded byThe Earl Baldwin of Bewdley
Peerage of the United Kingdom
New creation	Earl Lloyd-George of Dwyfor1945	Succeeded byRichard Lloyd George
	Viscount Gwynedd1945
Awards and achievements
Preceded byFrederick G. Banting	Cover of Time Magazine3 September 1923	Succeeded by Jack Dempsey